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The effective life management of large and diverse fleets of 
wind turbines is a new problem facing power system utilities. 
More specifically, the minimization of over-speed risk is of high 
importance due to the related impacts of possible loss of life and 
economic implications of over-speed, such as a loss of 
containment event. Meeting the goal of risk minimization is 
complicated by the large range of turbine types present in a 
typical fleet. These turbines may have different pitch systems, 
over-speed detection systems and also different levels of 
functional redundancy, implying different levels of risk. The 
purpose of this work is to carry out a quantitative comparison of 
over-speed risk in different turbine configurations, using a 
Markov process to model detection of faults and repair actions. 
In the medium-long term, the risk associated with different assets 
can used as a decision making aid. For example if the operator is 
a utility, it may want to avoid purchasing high risk sites in the 
future, or may need to develop mitigation strategies for turbines 
at high risk of over speed. 
 
Index Terms—Wind Turbine, Over speed, Risk, Markov 
Chain.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
NCREASED numbers of wind power projects mean that in 
many countries power utilities have to manage a large fleet 
comprising hundreds of machines. The speed of technological 
change is such that such a fleet typically includes multiple 
wind turbine configurations and ratings. With such large 
numbers of machines comes a responsibility to understand and 
minimize risk. One source of operational risk which has not 
received much attention is the issue of over speed risk: in 
particular, how different configurations compare in terms of 
risk. In normal operation, the vast majority of wind turbines 
use a pitch control mechanism as the primary control method. 
By changing the angle of attack of the rotor blades to the 
wind, the control system both maximizes power conversion 
efficiency and provides a crucial aerodynamic braking 
function. Adequate operation of this braking function is 
necessary to avoid over-speed conditions, where the rotor 
spins faster than the design limits allow. In this case there is a 
probability that the turbine will exceed its design load limits 
and lose its structural integrity. This is highly undesirable 
because in extreme cases such an event can cause loss of life, 
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alongside the lesser consideration of loss of an asset.  
In the short term this risk is managed by maintenance 
targeted at the critical components. However in the medium-
long term the utility has control over what sites are acquired, 
which sometimes involves purchase of older sites and turbines 
with less robust safety systems. This work shows that risk 
minimization objectives should also play a part in decision 
making. 
II. PREVIOUS WORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
The design requirements for wind turbines [1] state that 
“Any single failure in the sensing or non-safe-life structural 
parts of the systems implementing the control functions shall 
not lead to the malfunction of the protection functions. If two 
or more failures are interdependent or have a common cause, 
they shall be treated as a single failure.” This means that the 
turbine should not have a single point of failure in any system 
needed to stop the turbine (protection function). Although 
there are no formal requirements on utilities for the 
quantification of risk associated with wind turbines, those 
operators with large and diverse fleets are becoming 
increasingly interested in better understanding and managing 
this risk.  
The main body of work associated with this research area 
was carried out by researchers at ECN in the early 90’s [2, 3, 
4]. This represented the first time that probabilistic methods 
used in other safety critical environments were applied to wind 
turbines [2]. Among the methods suggested were fault trees, 
failure modes effects and criticality analysis (FMECA), 
reliability block diagrams and Monte Carlo simulation. State 
space diagrams were also suggested, however Markov Chains 
were not taken forward as a viable quantitative model for the 
analysis owing to solution complexity. However this could be 
remedied by using matrix multiplication instead of direct 
solution of the differential equations. 
 In [3] the authors applied these methods, looked at a 
structural breakdown of parts within a wind turbine and 
discussed failure detection methods such as inspection and 
condition monitoring. A fault tree analysis was carried out for 
the component parts such as rotor, nacelle and tower. Via this 
detailed analysis a flaw in the design of the studied turbine 
was detected and the authors suggested more sensor 
redundancy to cut down the risk of failure, showing the value 
of such an approach.  
Similar analyses were presented in [4] as part of a 
probabilistic safety assessment. This paper highlighted the 
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importance of a good working knowledge of the plant. State 
diagrams were used to categorise the wind turbine operational 
states. The methodology was tested successfully on two wind 
turbine designs. 
The same authors extended their approach to deal with 
geographic risk [5]. Over 200 severe incidents representing 43 
turbine years of operation were analysed using data from the 
WMEP database along with Danish and Dutch datasets. The 
probability of blade loss, turbine collapse etc. were quantified 
based on this dataset, providing a unique insight into 
frequency of such events. Geographic areas were classified 
according to 10 risk categories such as industrial area, roads 
etc. Maximmum blade throw distance was calculated so that 
areas at risk could be defined. Finally, indirect events were 
considered whereby a turbine failure could have secondary 
impacts e.g. oil tanker impact. The output of the work was a 
risk contour map which could be used by government to 
define where wind installations would be acceptable from a 
risk view point. 
The main body of research described above has been added 
to by other recent work. Dorsey [6] showed that by using 
traditional reliability methods such as those found in [7], a 
comparative study of an existing pitch system and proposed 
design changes can be quantitatively evaluated. In this way 
improvements can be made at manufacture to increase the 
reliability of sub-systems including safety systems.  
More specifically for over speed and wind turbine safety, A 
FMECA analysis of a wind turbine safety system was carried 
out successfully on a MW-class large wind turbine by Michos 
et al. [8].  
The effective management of risk is a relatively new 
problem to the wind industry, however this is not the case for 
other power generation types. In particular, the nuclear power 
industry has extremely high standards of operational safety 
which are maintained by extensive studies into reliability and 
risk. A seminal introduction to these methods, which have 
been practiced successfully since the birth of civil nuclear 
power in the 1950’s, can be found in [9]. 
 
III. DATA SOURCES 
Quantitative reliability data of wind turbine sub-systems can 
be found in [10] and have been used by various authors in 
reliability studies [11, 12]. However this data is not detailed 
enough to distinguish between different safety system 
configurations. Therefore a qualitative judgment must be 
made on reliability of safety subsystems which can then be 
translated into quantitative data by use of a risk assessment 
approach [13]. An example is shown in table I, which is an 
example of how organizations with an exposure to risk may 
establish an explicit link between qualitative and quantitative 
information. This approach is adopted initially in this work 
owing to a lack of sufficiently detailed or accessible 
quantitative data.  
 
 
 
TABLE I 
RISK ASSESSMENT TABLE 
Probability of Occurrence 
Descriptor 
highly 
improbable 
improbable occasional probable 
Highly 
probable 
 
λ = 1 x 10 
(power)  
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 
 
TABLE II 
HIGH LEVEL SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS 
Safety System Description System 1 System 2 System 3 
Wind turbine power rating < 1MW > 1MW > 1MW 
Active pitch actuation type Hydraulic Hydraulic Electric 
Pitch actuator redundancy No Yes Yes 
Over speed detection redundancy level 1 3 2 
 
IV. SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS 
Three generic wind turbine safety systems are analysed, 
representing the spread of configurations available on the 
market. The main differences between the three generic safety 
systems are summarized in table II. System 1 represents a 
lower power rating and an older configuration where pitch 
control is achieved via a single actuator connected to the three 
blades which provide the important braking function. System 
2 has hydraulic actuators for each blade and more redundancy 
in the over speed detection system. System 3 has an electric 
pitch system (motors rather than hydraulic cylinders).  
Reliability block diagrams (RBDs) were constructed for 
each of the three safety systems, identifying the key 
components comprising the safety system. The models were 
based on inspection of operator manuals of turbines in each of 
the three categories, and expert knowledge of staff involved in 
wind turbine operation and maintenance. For brevity only 
system 1 is illustrated in the main text, as seen in Figure 1 
(refer to appendix for systems 2 and 3). 
 
 
Fig. 1. Over Speed Reliability Block Diagram 
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The theory of reliability [14] states that for the case of series 
components, where failure of either component A or B 
indicates a possible breach in safety, the probability of fai
P(A+B) can be computed by equation 1 (in the context of 
equation 1, P(A)P(B) is negligible and this term is dropped in 
equation 3). Similarly for a situation where safety critical 
components have functional redundancy, all components 
would have to fail in order to have a safety breach, and the 
probability of failure of both components is shown in equation 
2. Taking system 1 as an example, equation 3 shows the 
expression for overall probability (PTOTAL) of safety system 
failure. The procedure is repeated for systems 2 and 3 in the 
results which follow. 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P A B P A P B P A P B+ = + −
 ( ) ( ) ( )P AB P A P B=
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10TOTALP P P P P P P P P P P= + + + + +
  
A comparison across the sub-systems is shown in Figure 2. 
The biggest single contributor across sub-systems is system 1 
‘actuator linkage to hub’. The probability of failure of this 
subsystem is higher than any other (this subsystem is not 
present in systems 2 and 3). The actuation system and over 
speed detection of system 2 is substantially more rel
those of the other two systems, however it can be seen that 
maintenance-induced failure is more likely. Thus each system 
has its own strengths and weaknesses. 
Figure 3 shows the overall probability of failure of the 
safety systems, combining all sub-systems into a single 
probability, PTOTAL. It is observed that overall system 3 is the 
least likely to fail, followed by system 2. This would be 
 
Fig. 2. Comparison of Failure Exposure Probabilities of 3 Wind Turbine 
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iable than 
intuitively expected since these represent more recent designs. 
System 1, representing older designs, has 
higher probability of failure in comparison.
 
 
Fig. 3. Combined Probability of Failure Exposure
 
The reliability block diagrams for each wind turbine 
configuration quantify the probability of the system being 
exposed to failure on an annual basis. However it may be 
possible to detect such conditions (e.g. via bi
inspection) before they cause an over
perform targeted remedial actions. Alternatively, the turbine 
may stay in its current state of exposure for some time,
experience loss of containment event while in this more 
vulnerable state. To characterise this process, a Markov 
process has been identified as the most suitable modeling 
framework. Markov models have been applied in the wind 
domain for quantification of reliability [15] and, more 
recently, studies of operation and maintenance [16, 17, 18], 
but without much safety systems focus.
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V.    MARKOV PROCESS DEFINITION 
It is necessary to define the states which correspond to the 
physical condition of the plant. The transition rates (λ, µ) 
characterize the dynamic behavior of the system as it moves 
between states. These are shown in the state space diagram 
Figure 4. Transition rate λ12 corresponds to PTOTAL in the RBD, 
that is the probability of the system being exposed to an over 
speed event through failure or impairment of the function of 
the safety system. 
The safety system dynamic behavior is calculated by setting 
the system into differential equations. Introducing a time ∆t 
suitably small so that the possibility of two transitions is 
negligible, and taking the probability of being in state one 
after the time step ∆t: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 11 4 41 5 51
P t t P t t P t µ t P t µ tλ+ ∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆  (4) 
 
 
11 12
1t tλ λ∆ = − ∆   (5) 
 
Inserting (5) into (4) and rearranging into differential 
equation format we get: 
 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )
1 1 12 4 41 5 51
1P t t P t t P t µ t P t µ tλ∴ + ∆ = − ∆ + ∆ + ∆  
 
 
( ) ( )
1 1
1
( ) '
P t t P t
P t
t
+ ∆ −
∴ =
∆
 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
1 12 4 41 5 51
P t P t µ P t µλ= − + +  
 
 
 
 
Similar equations can be deduced for the other states, 
together these are often shown in matrix form: 
 
( ) ( )[ ]
12 12
23 24 23 24
' '
35 35
1 5
41 41
51 51
( )
P t P t
λ λ
λ λ λ λ
λ λ
µ µ
µ µ
+
−
−
… = −
−
−
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
[ ]
1 5
( ) ( )P t P t× …   (6) 
 
Deducing general algebraic expressions for such systems as 
(6) is difficult, particularly where simplifying assumptions 
cannot be made. In many cases in the literature, general 
expressions are obtained by assuming that the values of λ and 
µ are equal [7]. Such assumptions cannot be made for this 
problem, so alternative solution methods are used. 
The problem can be re-formulated by discretising the 
Markov process. This is done by choosing an appropriate time 
resolution and multiplying this by the transition rate of 
interest. In this way we obtain (7). 
 
12 12
23 24 23 24
35 35
41 41
51 51
1
1 ( )
1
1
1
t t
t t t
t t
t t
t t
λ λ
λ λ λ λ
λ λ
µ µ
µ µ
+
− ∆ ∆
− ∆ ∆ ∆
− ∆ ∆
∆ − ∆
∆ − ∆
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(7) 
 
The solution is then obtained by multiplying the matrix by 
itself over the period of interest. This gives the probability of 
residing in each state, which can be used to calculate risk. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Over Speed State Space Diagram 
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A. Markov Process Parameters 
Table III summarises the Markov process parameters used 
in this study. The study focuses on a comparison of system 1 
and system 2 over speed risk. ∆t was chosen as 3 months, and 
so the annual rates of occurrence (λ, µ) are multiplied by 0.25 
to obtain λ∆t, µ∆t. The most difficult parameter to quantify is 
λ23 (rate of over speed once exposed). This is based on 
analysis of the dominant failure mode and its mechanism. In 
the case of system 1 it was determined via analysis of the 
system, that the probability of over speed (although greatly 
heightened) was relatively low even when exposed to failure 
(λ23=0.1, λ23∆t=0.025). On the other hand, the dominant failure 
mode of system 2 would almost certainly result in over speed 
once exposed (λ23=0.9, λ23∆t=0.225). The other main 
assumptions are that inspection is bi-annual (λ24=2, λ24∆t=0.5) 
and asset mean time to replacement is 1 year (µ51=1, 
µ51∆t=0.25). 
 
B. Risk Quantification Parameters 
Initially the risk metrics consider only economic impacts, in 
terms of cost CTOTAL. These arise from three sources as 
summarized in equation (8): 
 
Im TOTAL CAP DTIME LABC C C C= = + +  (8) 
 
Capital costs (CCAP) – Asset replacement  
If the system transits to state 3, this indicates a loss of 
containment event. Asset replacement cost is taken as £1m per 
MW, where system 1 wind turbine rating (WTR) is 0.5MW 
and system 2 is rated at 2MW. This cost is unaffected by 
duration of time before the unit is replaced. 
 
Lost revenue caused by downtime (CDTIME) – Asset 
replacement and maintenance visits 
The system can suffer loss of revenue due to maintenance 
inspection (state 4) or asset replacement downtime (state 5). In 
the case of inspection it is assumed that downtime (∆DT) is 
equal to 8 hours. To represent this, the state probability of 
inspection will be multiplied by the cost of inspection (see 
labour costs) to determine the risk associated with inspection.  
In the case of asset replacement, loss of production is taken 
as one annual quarter (3 months, ∆DT =2016 hours). The cost 
to the owner, CDTIME, is calculated assuming a capacity factor 
of 30% (CF=0.3) and electricity production credit (EPC) of 
£76/MWh, using equation (9). 
 
 [ ]DTIME DTC EPC CF WTR= ∆ ⋅ ⋅   (9) 
 
Labour costs (CLAB) – Maintenance visits 
Labour costs are taken as £30/hr and are worked out on the 
basis of a two-man team working an 8 hour shift. 
 
In the results that follow, the risk is taken by multiplying 
the Cost impact (Im) for each state by each individual state 
probability. 
VI.    RESULTS 
The state probabilities are obtained by populating (7) with 
numerical data from Table III, and then multiplying the matrix 
by itself for the desired time period [7]. A time period of 10 
years was chosen, therefore the number of iterations was 40 
for each matrix. Row 1 of the resultant matrix is of most 
interest as this represents each state probability given that the 
system started in state 1 (fully functional).  
 
TABLE III 
MARKOV PROCESS PARAMETERS 
Parameter Symbol λ sys 1 λ∆t sys1 λ sys2 λ∆t sys2 
Rate of exposure to 
over speed (Ptotal 
from RBD) 
λ12 1x10
-1 2.5 x10-2 1x10-4 2.5 x10-5 
Rate of over speed 
once exposed 
λ23 1x10
-1 2.5 x10-2 9x10-1 2.25x10-1 
Rate of inspection λ24 2 5x10
-1 2 5x10-1 
Rate of transit to 
down state 
λ35 1* 1 1* 1 
Repair rate if failure 
detected 
µ41 1* 1 1* 1 
Replacement rate 
after loss of 
containment 
µ51 1 2.5x10
-1 1 2.5x10-1 
*Unity regardless of time resolution 
 
A. State Probabilities 
The steady state behavior of the system is the same regardless 
of starting value. The evolution of the state probabilities over 
each iteration are plotted in figure 5 for system 1 and figure 6 
for system 2.  
 
 
Fig. 5. Convergence of System 1 
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Fig. 6. Convergence of System 2
 
B. Influence of Inspection Regime 
The number of inspections was varied from 0 to 3 visits per 
annum to establish the importance of inspection frequency on 
the mimimisation of over speed risk in the t
designs. Table IV summarises how the Markov process 
parameters change in this case. 
 
TABLE IV 
INSPECTION REGIME MARKOV PROCESS PARAMETERS
Inspections per annum λ24∆t Sys 1 λ22∆t 
0 0 0.975 
1 0.25 0.725 
2 0.5 0.475 
3 0.75 0.225 
 
Figure 7 shows system 1 risk contributions from each state. 
State 3, associated with asset replacement, dominates along 
with lost energy due to downtime inflicted by time spent in 
state 5. Figure 8 shows the result for system 2 risk. It can be 
seen that the risk for system 2 is roughly two orders of 
magnitude smaller than system 1 when they are compared 
directly in figure 9. This figure also shows that inspections 
have a higher effectiveness in system 1.  
Therefore it can be concluded that inspection as a m
controlling over speed risk is much more cost effective on 
older, system 1 wind turbines than newer system 2 turbines.
 
Fig. 7. Risk for System 1 States 
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Fig. 8. Risk for System 2 States
 
Fig. 9. Direct Comparison of System Risk
 
C. Implications for Wind Turbine Fleets
An important issue related to individual system safety is 
how the probability of an over speed event (due to failure of 
the safety system) scales with increasing number of installed 
turbines. Many wind farm operators expect to grow
substantially in the near to medium term if support 
arrangements for wind power remain in place. The question of 
how this up-scaling affects their risk exposure is of great 
interest. For this reason, figure 10 shows potential growth in 
the number of system 2 wind turbines installed. The risk scales 
linearly with the number of machines in the field.
It is interesting to note that, in terms of over speed risk, 
even a high number of system 2 turbines does not exceed the 
risk of roughly 20 system 1 turbines (typical wind farm size). 
In practical terms this illustrates how much safety systems in 
wind turbines have improved in recent years (especially in 
terms of functional redundancy), but also shows the 
importance of good training for wind turbine 
order to minimse risk of an over speed event, since the main 
contributor to system 2 turbine probability of failure is 
maintenance-related. This is one area where the wind farm 
operator has long-term control over the risk (once the warranty 
period has elapsed), although inevitably some turbines are 
easier to maintain than others.  
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Fig. 10. System Risk in Terms of Numbers of Units in the Field and Safety 
System Type  
 
 
There is a second main conclusion concerning acquisition 
policy of wind farm owners such as utilities. The higher over 
speed risk associated with older machines (such as system 1) 
should be taken into consideration when acquisitions are 
made, with special attention given to possible over speed 
issues. Without due consideration of the analysis presented 
here, utilities could end up taking on significant future 
economic liabilities they are unaware of. Such risk can be 
significantly reduced via more frequent inspection, as shown 
in this paper.  
The alternatives in terms of risk reduction are, in the mid
long term, to re-power the site or to avoid acquiring older 
turbine designs. 
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
The life management of wind farms is growing in 
importance as more turbines are installed. Operators are likely 
to have fleets comprising many turbine types with different 
safety systems. By analysing the reliability of key subsystems 
such as the pitch system, and over speed detection system, 
operators can get a better idea about their exposure to risk. 
This risk is a function of the design of the safety systems of 
those turbines and is also proportional to the number of 
operational turbines in the fleet. This paper has shown that 
more modern safety systems represented by system 2 are 
much more reliable than older systems represented by system 
1. This is primarily because of increased functional 
redundancy in modern wind turbine safety systems. 
Mitigation strategies are available to control the risk of 
older turbine types such as system 1. It is emphasized that 
inspection is a useful and practical tool to reduce risk of over 
speed in older machines such as system 1 turbines. However 
there are other avenues going forward, such as increased use 
of condition monitoring. The existing CMS signals such as 
blade pitch angle can be used as a measure of p
health. Major failure of the pitch system in particular may be 
detectable by interpretation of pitch angle variation as 
captured in WT SCADA. No extra capital cost is required, 
however several extra man-hours of data processing will be 
needed. 
 
-
 
itch system 
Another alternative mitigation strategy is conducting 
detailed fault tree analysis on the safety system for greater 
understanding of malfunction triggers. Such analysis is highly 
specific to individual designs, and is the basis of ongoing work 
by the authors.  
It should be highlighted that geographic risk was not 
included in the analysis. Such risk can be significant as shown 
by the authors of [5]. It would be interesting to see how 
geographical or environmental risk affected the conclusions in 
figure 10 in particular.  
APPENDIX
System 2 is described by (10)  
 
1 4 2 5 3 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
( )( )( )
TOTAL
P P P P P P P P P P P P P P= + + + + + +
 
System 3 is described by (11)  
 
1 4 7 2 5 8 3 6 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
( )( )( )
TOTAL
P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P= + + + + + + + + +
7
 
 
 (10) 
 
  (11) 
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